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ABSTRACT 
Augmenting Wireless Security Using Zero-Forcing Beamforming 
by 
Narendra Anand 
We present the design and experimental evaluation of Simultaneous TRansmissions 
with Orthogonally Blinded Eavesdroppers (STROBE). STROBE is a cross-layer approach 
that exploits the multi-stream capabilities of existing technologies such as 802.11n and the 
upcoming 802.11ac standard where multi-antenna APs construct simultaneous data streams 
using Zero-Forcing Beamforming (ZFBF). Instead of using this technique for simultane-
ous data stream generation, STROBE utilizes ZFBF by allowing an AP to use one stream 
to communicate with an intended user and the remaining streams to orthogonally "blind" 
(actively interfere) with any potential eavesdropper thereby preventing eavesdroppers from 
decoding nearby transmissions. Through extensive experimental evaluation, we show that 
STROBE reliably outperforms Omnidirectional, Single-User Beamforming (SUBF), and 
directional antenna based transmission methods by keeping the transmitted signal at the 
intended receiver and shielded from eavesdroppers. In an indoor Wireless LAN environ-
ment, STROBE consistently serves an intended user with a signal 15 dB stronger than an 
eavesdropper. 
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Cliapter 1 
Introduction 
The broadcast nature of wireless communication necessitates the development and use of 
robust security protocols in order to thwart eavesdroppers from intercepting transmissions 
directed toward an intended user. While encryption mitigates this vulnerability, it is not 
foolproof. Even industry standard encryption methods such as WEP or WPA have been 
compromised [1] and readily available software packages* exist that allow malicious users 
to easily defeat "secure" networks. 
One method of enhancing the security of wireless transmissions is to prevent the eaves-
dropper from receiving or decoding the transmitted signal. A candidate solution is a direc-
tional transmission scheme that focuses signal energy toward an intended receiver using a 
directional antenna, switched-beam, or a single-target adaptive beamforming transmission 
method. However, in practice, such techniques that depend on the predictable behavior of 
transmitted beam patterns or that are agnostic to the entire eavesdropper environment fail 
to prevent eavesdropping as confirmed by our own experiments (see also [21). 
To address this problem, we present a new multi-antenna, 802.11-compatible protocol 
that adaptively sends a beam toward an intended user while "blinding" (actively interfering 
with) potential eavesdroppers, STROBE (Simultaneous TRansmissions with Orthogonally 
Blinded Eavesdroppers). STROBE leverages the potential of a Zero-Forcing Beamforming 
(ZFBF) transmitter to send a signal toward an intended user while simultaneously trans-
* Aircrack-ng - Available at: www. aircrack-ng. org 
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mitting "orthogonally blinding" streams (defined in Chapter 2.3) everywhere else. 
ZFBF is a precoding method that allows a multi-antenna access point (AP) to create 
multiple simultaneous spatial streams [3]. Recent wireless standards such as 802.lIn or 
the upcoming 802.lIact employ physical layers that implement ZFBF to construct mul-
tiple parallel transmission streams to a single user (lIn) or simultaneously to multiple 
users (lIac). Because such existing technologies already have the ability to create mul-
tiple parallel streams, STROBE can be easily implemented in these systems with minor AP 
modification and no client modification. 
In particular, this thesis has the following main contributions: First, we design and 
implement STROBE in an FPGA-based radio platform that allows for over-the-air (OTA) 
characterization in a variety of different environments. Moreover, for comparative evalu-
ation, we implement (i) Omnidirectional, (ii) Single-User Bearnforming (SUBF), (iii) Di-
rectional Antenna, (iv) and Cooperating Eavesdropper (CE) schemes. CE is an unrealistic 
scheme in which eavesdroppers cooperate with the transmitter by providing their channel 
information allowing the transmitter to precisely blind the eavesdropper. While in practice 
eavesdroppers would never aid the transmitter, CE provides a "best case" benchmark for 
thwarting eavesdroppers via ZFBF. 
Second, we construct a baseline WLAN scenario and evaluate STROBE's performance 
against the aforementioned baseline schemes. After confirming that STROBE better con-
trols leaked signal energy as compared to Omnidirectional transmissions, we show that 
STROBE blinds eavesdroppers more than the single-target directional schemes (Single-
User Beamforming and Directional Antenna). While the single-target schemes properly 
direct a beam toward an intended user, they do nothing to prevent that signal energy from re-
flecting throughout the environment allowing eavesdroppers to overhear the signal. In con-
tSee standards. ieee. org and mentor. ieee. org for the lIn and llac standards, respectively. 
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trast, STROBE actively thwarts eavesdroppers by using simultaneous interference streams 
to blind them, thereby severely diminishing their ability to eavesdrop. 
Additionally, we show that even when compared against the (unrealistic) Cooperating 
Eavesdropper, STROBE realizes a greater signal energy difference between the intended 
user and the eavesdropper. CE's ability to decrease the eavesdroppers' overheard signal 
energy comes at a cost: the intended user's served signal strength also decreases (to a 
greater extent) as a side effect of ZFBF's "zero-interference" condition. Thus, although 
CE can precisely blind eavesdroppers decreasing their overheard energy, the net result is 
STROBE serving a larger signal energy gain between the intended user and eavesdropper 
thanCE. 
Third, we show that, despite the use of beam forming in our system design, eavesdropper 
proximity or orientation relative to the intended user has a negligible effect on STROBE's 
ability to serve an intended user while blinding potential eavesdroppers. STROBE exploits 
multi-path effects in indoor environments by harnessing signal reflections to reach the in-
tended user. In fact, at a relative eavesdropper proximity of a quarter wavelength (3.25 cm) 
from the intended user, STROBE still serves the intended user with a 10 db stronger signal 
than the eavesdropper. Moreover, even an eavesdropper that positions itself directly in front 
of or behind the intended user is thwarted. 
Fourth, we explore STROBE's dependence on multi-path reflections by performing ex-
periments in an open, outdoor environment. Because the environment contains no physical 
obstacles to cause reflections, STROBE must use the direct, line-of-sight (LOS) path to 
serve the intended user. We find a marked detrimental effect on STROBE's efficacy as 
eavesdroppers can easily overhear signal energy at close by locations, i.e., STROBE re-
quires a multi-path rich, WLAN type environment to achieve its goals. 
Finally, we consider a nomadic eavesdropper that traverses an environment attempting 
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to find a location to successfully eavesdrop. We show that even if the eavesdropper ex-
haustively traverses the room, it is still thwarted by STROBE. In contrast, eavesdroppers 
can very easily find suitable eavesdropping locations for the other transmission schemes 
considered, including the use of a directional antenna. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives background on ZFBP 
and the orthogonal blinding method employed by STROBE. Chapter 3 describes our exper-
imental platform and methodology for the evaluation of STROBE. Chapter 4 is a baseline 
evaluation of STROBE. Chapter 5 explores the effects of eavesdropper proximity and loca-
tion with relation to the intended user and transmitter. Chapter 6 evaluates STROBE in an 
open, outdoor environment with fewer multi-path effects. Chapter 7 evaluates the robust-
ness of STROBE against a nomadic eavesdropper. Chapter 8 describes related work and 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. 
5 
Chapter 2 
Background 
In this chapter, we first describe the mechanics of Zero-Forcing Beamforming, the core 
technique behind STROBE. We then detail the mechanism of "Orthogonal Blinding," the 
key component of STROBE that enhances wireless security. 
2.1 Conventions 
2.1.1 System Model 
STROBE is a downlink transmission technique. We consider a system consisting of a multi-
antenna AP and several single antenna users. This system is typical for current WLAN 
networks because APs have the ability to support complex, multi-antenna technologies 
whereas users, such as smartphones, are limited by constraints such as size, computational 
ability, and power consumption to single antenna methods. 
Of the single-antenna users, we call the user to which the transmission is intended the 
"Intended User" (IU). We call the unintended users who are attempting to overhear the 
transmission "Eavesdroppers" (E). 
2.1.2 Notation 
The following section describes the notation used. Further definition and description will 
follow in the appropriate chapters. N refers to the number of transmit antennas at the AP. 
M refers to the number of concurrently served, single-antenna users. 
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The row vector hm is a 1 x N channel state vector for user m. Each element of h 
corresponds to the complex exponential gain of one transmit antenna to the user. The 
matrix H = [hI; h2 ; .•. ; hMl is the M x N channel matrix constructed using each users h 
as its rows. 
The column vector Wm is an N x 1 beamsteering weight vector for user m. Each 
element of W corresponds to the complex exponential gain used by each transmit antenna 
during transmission. The matrix W = [WI W2 ... wml is the N x M steering weight matrix 
consisting of each users W as its columns. 
2.2 ZFBF Overview 
ZFBF is a precoding transmission method that allows an AP to construct multiple, concur-
rent spatial streams that can transmit data to mUltiple users in parallel. The basic principle 
is to first take each user's view of the channel, h, and construct a corresponding W for each 
h. Each user's data stream is then multiplied its corresponding w, summed together and 
transmitted over the AP's antenna array. Careful selection of wallows for the construction 
of concurrent spatial streams and parallel transmission of multiple users' data. 
The optimal method of constructing W from H to concurrently serve multiple users is 
known as Dirty Paper Coding (DPC) [4,51; however, in practice this method is difficult to 
implement due to its complexity. Instead of DPC, ZFBF is a W construction method that 
is a simpler, sub-optimal, approach that is practical to implement [3]. 
ZFBF selects weights that cause zero inter-user interference (the effect of one beam-
formed stream on another is "forced" to zero). The authors of [6] have shown that the 
optimal selection of W to satisfy this zero-interference condition is the pseudo-inverse of 
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H as shown in Eq. (2.1)*. 
W = Ht = H*(HH*tl (2.1) 
The use of the pseudo-inverse is how the zero-interference condition is achieved: if 
W = Ht then hiWj = 0 for i =I- j. Additionally, note that the matrix multiplication shown 
in Eq. (2.1) places a limit on the maximum number of concurrent users (or spatial streams). 
The number of concurrent streams must be less than or equal to the number of transmit 
antennas (Le., M :=:; N). 
In our implementation, we feed back channel state information (CSI), an h vector, via 
the RTSICTS in compliance with 802.11 ac and 11 n. 
2.3 Orthogonal Blinding 
The key mechanism of STROBE is the concept of "orthogonal blinding" that occurs in 
parallel with transmission to the intended user. 
"Blinding" is the method of actively concealing the intended user's signal by over-
whelming any potential eavesdroppers with garbage transmissions. These blinding streams 
are transmitted concurrently with the transmitter using extra available streams provided by 
a ZFBF enabled AP. In order to ensure that these blinding streams cause the least possible 
decrease of the intended user's transmitted signal, these streams are constructed orthogo-
nally to stream of the intended user. 
The streams used for the intended user and for blinding correspond to different W vec-
tors, which come from the pseudo-inverse of H. Thus, to construct orthogonal blinding 
streams, we construct orthogonal h vectors to the intended user's h and then perform ZFBF 
on the constructed H matrix. 
*v' refers to the complex conjugate transpose of vector v. 
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To construct these orthogonal h vectors, we use the Gram-Schmidt process [7]. First, 
we take the intended user's CSI and set it as hI. We then pad hI with a truncated (M -1) x N 
identity matrix to build a preliminary H matrix. Finally, we construct the CSI matrix 
~ 
with orthogonal rows, H by using the Gram-Schmidt process shown in Eq. (2.2) on the 
preliminary H. 
The resulting fi is unitary. Thus the calculation of its pseudo-inverse is trivial: W = fit = 
~ 
H*. 
Additionally, the Gram-Schmidt process is simple to integrate into an 802.11 nl11 ac AP. 
Both of these technologies are capable of ZFBF, an algorithm that requires the computation 
of a matrix pseudo-inverse. The first step of this calculation is implemented in hardware us-
ing QR decomposition [8], an operation that decomposes a matrix into an upper triangular 
(R) and a unitary matrix (Q). The Gram-Schmidt process can also be computed using the 
QR method. Thus, the silicon in the physical layer of 802.11n or 802.11ac already exists 
to perform this algorithm; the only change necessary is how the input matrix is loaded. 
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Chapter 3 
Experimental Setup 
In this chapter we present our implementation of STROBE and our experimental evaluation 
methodology. 
3.1 Experimental Platform 
We conduct our experiments using WARPLab*, a framework that integrates the versatil-
ity of MATLAB with the capabilities of an FPGA based software defined radio platform 
(WARP). WARPLab gives the ability to rapidly prototype physical layer algorithms in 
MATLAB while using the WARP nodes to perform over-the-air (OTA) characterizations 
of those algorithms. 
The WARPLab flow consists of two main parts: MATLAB on the host PC and the 
WARP node. All baseband processing for a physical (PRY) layer algorithm occurs in 
MATLAB on a host PC while the OTA transmission and reception of the processed signal 
is handled by the WARP nodes. 
A single host PC can be connected to up to 16 WARP nodes through an Ethernet switch. 
MATLAB on the host PC processes a given bit stream using the prescribed PRY layer algo-
rithm and then downloads the processed I1Q samples through the switch to the transmitting 
WARP node. The host PC then sends a sequence of control signals that enable connected 
nodes and trigger the transmission and reception of the OTA signal. 
·Rice University WARP Project - Available at warp. rice. edu 
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Each node contains four large sample buffers t connected to four 2.4 GHz radio cards. 
These buffers either accept data over Ethernet for transmission or through the radio card 
for reception. Receiving nodes can then upload the received samples through the switch 
for decoding along with received Received Signal Strength (RSS) values in dBm. 
For the evaluation of STROBE, the multi-antenna transmitter must sound the channel 
in order to obtain the relevant CSI (h vector) for the necessary receivers. This channel 
sounding followed by the transmission is accomplished by implementing the CSI feedback 
channel through the switch, Hand W calculation in MATLAB, and beamforming weight 
multiplication in the WARP node. For the characterization of STROBE, we use the ZFBF 
experimental framework we built on top of WARP Lab in [9]. 
STROBE Experimental 
Platform 
Figure 3.1 : STROBE Experimental Platform. 
We employ one transmit antenna for the receivers and all four for the transmitter (thus 
t Each buffer can hold 216 I and Q samples 
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N = 4 for our characterization). Our antenna array is circular with the antennas spaced 
one wavelength apart for 2.4 GHz (A = 12.5 cm). An example of the transmitting node is 
shown in Fig. 3.1. 
3.2 Experimental Methodology 
In this section we describe how we conduct our experiments. Specifically, we focus on 
schemes used for baseline comparison and the measurement procedure. 
3.2.1 Scheme Comparison 
In this section we detail the different baseline transmission schemes compared against 
STROBE. 
Omnidirectional Transmission 
The initial baseline scheme we consider is the Omnidirectional transmission. Because 
this is the most commonly used wireless transmission method, it is important to observe 
where the intended user's transmitted energy is sent. This method reflects the status quo 
conditions under which existing wireless transmissions occur. 
Single-User Beamforming 
Single-User Beamforming (SUBF) is the fundamental, adaptive directional technique. It is 
a transmission method that employs an antenna array to steer a beam toward an intended 
user based on that user's CSI (h vector). SUBF can be considered a subset of ZFBF in 
that the number of "concurrent" users is one. Because there is only one intended user, the 
zero-interference condition does not exist (since there is no other stream to interfere with) 
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so the selection of weights results in the maximum possible received signal energy at the 
intended user (for a ZFBF type scheme). 
Calculation of the SUBF steering weight is trivial since the H matrix consists of only 
vector. Plugging in a single row H matrix (the case where M = 1) results in: (HlxN)t = 
(H1xN )* = WNx1 . Thus, the intended user's steering weight for SUBF is its complex 
conjugate transpose, which is equivalent to the intended user's weight for STROBE. 
However, in order to ensure a fair comparison, the power allocation to the steering 
weights of SUBF and STROBE differs, which contributes to a difference in intended user's 
received signal energy. This difference, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, 
results in 4x greater transmit power allocated to the intended user's steering weight when 
using SUBF compared to STROBE. 
Thus, SUBF is a necessary baseline because it is the existing scheme that maximizes 
the signal energy at the intended user. 
Cooperating Eavesdropper 
Finally, we compare STROBE against the unfeasible baseline, the Cooperating Eavesdrop-
per (CE). This scheme explores the unrealistic scenario where the eavesdropper actively 
aids in their blinding by providing the transmitter with their channel estimates. While this 
scenario would never occur in practice, it is essentially an upper limit of a ZFBF-based 
scheme's potential performance. 
With knowledge of eavesdropper channel information (the eavesdroppers' h vectors), 
the transmitter has access to the "true" H matrix. This allows the transmitter to precisely 
blind eavesdroppers because of the zero-interference condition. Specifically, this condition 
signifies that the intended user's signal will result in zero overheard signal (zero interfer-
ence) at the cooperating eavesdropper's locations. Thus, even if the transmitter does not use 
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the additional streams for blinding signals, the eavesdroppers will still be unable to over-
hear the intended user's signal. We showed in [9] that a four antenna transmitter serving 
four concurrent users causes less than 1 dB of inter-user interference. 
Although this implies that CE can construct a beam to the intended user that cannot be 
overheard by the (cooperating) eavesdroppers, we still use the remaining three streams for 
blinding to ensure a fair comparison. 
Thus, CE is a necessary baseline because it minimizes the signal energy overheard by 
the eavesdroppers. 
3.2.2 Measurement Procedure 
In this section we describe how and what measurements are taken to characterize STROBE. 
Performance Metric 
Our performance metric for the evaluation of STROBE is Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) 
or Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) expressed in dB. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.1, the WARPLab platform allows us to measure RSS in terms of dBm; however, 
the inherent differences in RSS measurements between radio transceivers result in dBm 
readings that cannot be fairly compared. 
To overcome this, we calculate SNR and SINR values from the difference between 
two back-to-back measurements performed at the intended user and all eavesdroppers. For 
example, for Omnidirectional and SUBF transmissions, we first measure the RSS with 
the transmission (the signal) and then measure the RSS again without a transmission (the 
noise). The difference between the two is the SNR. The multi-stream methods are mea-
sured similarly. For STROBE and CE, we first transmit all four data streams and measure 
the RSS (the signal). Then we set the intended user's steering weight to zeros and redo 
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the measurement. The second measurement at the intended user and the eavesdropper 
represents the signal energy from the blinding streams in addition to the noise floor (the 
interference plus noise). The difference between these two measurements is the SINR. For 
the remainder of this thesis, we refer to this received signal energy as the SINR. 
Power Allocation 
To ensure a fair comparison, we set the net transmit power for all schemes equivalent 
regardless of the number of antennas or streams used. Omnidirectional (one antenna) 
and SUBF (four antennas) transmissions use equivalent power to serve the intended user. 
STROBE and CE generate N transmit streams so the intended user's stream is allocated 
1/ Nth the overall transmit power. This net transmit power control is implemented by the 
appropriate normalization of the W matrix. 
Data Collection 
For each data point in our results, we averaged 30 OTA transmission measurements. All 
data points presented standard deviations of 1 dB or less. All experiments were conducted 
in an interference-free channel.:!: 
tarA experiments were conducted using the 802.11-2.4 GHz channel14, which consumer WiFi devices 
are not allowed to use in the USA. 
15 
Chapter 4 
Baseline WLAN Scenario 
In this chapter we evaluate STROBE using a baseline WLAN topology. Namely, we ex-
plore STROBE's ability to exploit a rich, multi-path fading (indoor) environment in order 
to not only serve an intended user but also to blind the intended signal to the eavesdroppers. 
4.1 Experimental Setup 
To realize a typical WLAN scenario, our initial experiment is comprised of a conference 
room topology. In particular, as depicted in Fig. 4.1, four receivers are placed along the 
far edge of a large table. The room itself is in the shape of a long rectangle filled with 
metal chairs and surrounded by metal blinds making it a multi-path rich environment. The 
receivers are separated by 1.25 m and the AP is separated from the group of users by a 5 
m distance. We set one receiver to be the intended user (labeled IU) and the other three 
Conference Table 
Note: Figure 
not to scale 
Figure 4.1 : Basic WLAN Topology 
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receivers to be eavesdroppers (labeled El -3). In addition to evaluating the performance of 
STROBE, we also perform experiments with Omnidirectional, SUBF, and CE as baselines 
for comparison. Additionally, we perform the experiments with the intended user in the 
other three eavesdropper locations and obtained similar results (included in Appendix A.I). 
4.2 Experimental Results 
Fig. 4.2 shows the received SINR at each of the four receivers when data was transmitted 
toward the intended user. In this graph, the SINR at the intended user is indicative of the 
Received SIN R of transmission to IU 
. . -25 ....... : ............... ~ ............... : ........... . 
5 
o 
- - -
- . 
. . 
. -
••••••••••••• 1\. •••••••• t ••• ,.,.." •••••• t •• 
IU 
Omni SUBF STROBE CE 
Figure 4.2 : SINR at ill and Overheard SINR at El -3 
intended received signal energy while the SINR at E l -3 shows the power of the intended 
user's signal the eavesdroppers overheard. 
Omnidirectional Transmission 
The use of an Omnidirectional transmission (depicted in dark blue), yields an even greater 
SINR at the eavesdropper locations than the intended user for this topology. This highlights 
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the high vulnerability of existing systems to transmissions overheard by eavesdroppers, a 
critical security issue when encryption protocols are unused or defeated. 
Single-User Beamforming 
Compared to an Omnidirectional transmission, SUBF (light blue) better directs a signal's 
energy toward the intended user. However, there is nonetheless a large amount of energy 
available at other locations for the eavesdroppers to overhear and intercept. Indeed, in this 
topology, the energy at the eavesdropper locations is equivalent to or greater than the Om-
nidirectional case. This behavior is not a flaw; rather, it is a consequence of the design. 
SUBF's only goal is to maximize the SINR at the intended user, but does so completely 
agnostic to other locations. For this reason, the signal transmitted by SUBF does not re-
main solely at the intended user but instead spills over to various other areas causing the 
scheme to be as vulnerable as an Omnidirectional transmission. This specific consequence 
of SUBF is further highlighted by the transmit power allocation method. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3.2.2, in order to ensure a fair comparison, the net transmit power for all schemes 
is equivalent regardless of the number of antennas used. Thus, the eavesdroppers overheard 
the intended user's signal just as well (if not better as at E3) as the Omnidirectional trans-
mission even with equivalent transmit powers and SUBF's inherently directional nature. 
STROBE 
Unlike Omnidirectional and SUBF transmissions, STROBE (yellow) blinds the eavesdrop-
pers and mitigates the possibility of overhearing the signal to the intended user. As de-
scribed in Chapter 2.3, STROBE blinds eavesdroppers by creating multiple, simultaneous, 
transmission streams, using one to transmit to the intended user and using the others to 
interfere with any other user's attempt to overhear the intended signal. Actively blind-
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ing potential eavesdropper locations results in a maximum 3 dB eavesdropper SINR (at 
E3) for this topology. Although the intended user's steering weight is identical to SUBF 
(as discussed in Chapter 3.2.1), the use of additional, orthogonal, blinding weights allows 
STROBE to diminish the SINR at the eavesdroppers while still maximizing the SINR at the 
intended user. Again, this effect is further emphasized by the power allocation scheme; not 
only does the net transmit power remain fixed regardless of the number of antennas used 
but also regardless of the number of spatial streams employed. The use of four streams in 
our evaluation results in a 4x decrease in the transmit power allocated to the intended user's 
stream. However, for the price of this resulting 6 dB SINR decrease at the intended user, 
STROBE causes a 15-22 dB decrease in SINR at the eavesdroppers. 
To estimate how STROBE's measured energy levels would perform in a commodity 
device, we employ the theoretical Gaussian model for BPSK (for a conservative estimate) 
and compute approximate bit error rates (BERs) for the observed SINRs. The intended 
user's served SINR of 14 dB corresponds to a BER of approximately 5.4 x 10-5 whereas 
the maximum eavesdropper SINR of 4 dB corresponds to an approximate BER of 2.3 x 
10-2 . This conservative estimate shows that STROBE serves an intended user with a BER 
three orders of magnitude lower than the eavesdropper, thus significantly decreasing the 
likelihood of an eavesdropper decoding an intended user's transmission. 
Cooperating Eavesdropper 
As a baseline for evaluating STROBE, we examine the realistically unfeasible scenario of 
the cooperating eavesdropper (red) where the eavesdroppers provide their channel infor-
mation to the transmitter to aid in their blinding. The extra information provided to the 
CE scheme allows it to precisely blind potential eavesdroppers. This additional accuracy 
manifests as the eavesdroppers' SINRs equaling approximately 0 dB, but the only benefit 
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over STROBE is a maximum 3 dB decrease in the overheard signal at E3. However, this 
decrease comes at the cost of a 3 dB decrease in the intended user's SINR so the relative 
gain of CE at the intended user over the eavesdropper is equivalent at E3 and less at El -2 
than STROBE. This effect is further explored in Chapter 4.3. 
4.3 STROBE vs. CE 
For our comparisons between STROBE and CE, we purposely set the number of overall 
receivers to four, a decision that results in the "best case" results for CEo This decision and 
the observed results also highlight a subtle difference in the two schemes' mechanisms. 
The precision of any ZFBF based transmission scheme is dependent on the number 
of transmit antennas. The number of spatial streams that may be constructed is equal to 
the size of the transmit antenna array. Although both CE and STROBE are able to create 
an equivalent number of streams, STROBE creates its blinding streams solely based on 
the channel state of the intended user whereas CE considers all users. The consequence 
of this characteristic is that CE is only able to precisely blind as many eavesdroppers as 
one less than the number of transmit antennas. If we were to perform this experiment 
with additional eavesdroppers, our four antenna transmitter (when employing CE) would 
only be able precisely blind three of the eavesdroppers; the remaining eavesdroppers would 
overhear the signal with an SINR comparable to STROBE. 
Both STROBE and CE construct multiple blinding streams using ZFBF. However, 
the manner in which STROBE constructs the channel matrix around the intended user's 
channel state (h vector) guarantees a maximum served SINR to the intended user (using 
some weight w) because the constructed matrix is unitary and the resulting intended user's 
w = h* (as detailed in Chapter 2.3). This resulting w vector is equivalent to the SUBF 
weight and is the best that ZFBF can provide. The resulting W matrix still satisfies ZFBF's 
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zero interference condition. However, CE 's construction of the H matrix is based on all 
users' channel estimates. For CE to satisfy the zero interference condition, the intended 
user's weight loses magnitude. 
Thus, the signal energy at an eavesdropper from STROBE and CE (after the maximal 
number of eavesdroppers) is equivalent; however, STROBE will always be able to serve 
the intended user with a higher SINR. We verify this in Fig. 4.2 where CE results in less 
overheard signal energy but also less served energy to the intended user. Although CE is 
completely unfeasible in a real system and uses ZFBF in its intended manner for precise 
blinding, STROBE will still always provide a higher SINR to the intended user and the 
benefits of this scheme will still function regardless of the number of eavesdroppers. 
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Chapter 5 
Relative Eavesdropper Location 
In this chapter we evaluate the effect of eavesdropper position relative to the transmitter 
and the intended user. This analysis is done in two parts. In Chapter 5.1, we examine the 
effect of eavesdropper proximity to the intended user. Then, in Chapter 5.2, we examine 
the effect of eavesdroppers in line with the intended user and transmitter. We conduct both 
experiments in the same setting as the experiment in Chapter 4. 
5.1 Eavesdropper Proximity 
The purpose of this experiment is to quantify the effect of eavesdropper distance relative to 
the intended user. Because this is a spatially based transmission method, we will examine 
how close the eavesdroppers can be to the intended user before the efficacy of STROBE be-
gins to diminish. Specifically, the motivation for this experiment is from the observed cor-
relation in Chapter 4 between the proximity of the eavesdroppers to the intended user and 
the performance of beamforming based schemes. The results for that experiment (Fig. 4.2) 
show an increased overheard SINR at E3 for SUBF and STROBE (although only a slight 
increase for the latter). 
In [9], we showed that separation distance between receivers has a negligible effect on 
the served SINR when using a ZFBF based transmission scheme (such as CE). While we 
expect CE to cause low inter-user interference because the AP has knowledge of all users' 
channels. the efficacy of STROBE is unclear in this situation. We do not expect STROBE to 
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match the intra-user interference reduction performance of CE (because STROBE only has 
the intended user's channel information); however, we do expect the blinding streams to 
compensate for this by overwhelming the overheard signal to the point where the overheard 
SINR is similarly minimal. 
5.1.1 Experimental Setup 
We evaluate the effect of eavesdropper proximity on STROBE by placing the intended user 
at a fixed,S m distance from the transmitter with a direct line-of-sight (LOS) path and sur-
rounding it by a circle of three eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 5.1. For each measurement, 
we vary the radius of this circle (d) and express the distance in terms of A. We place the 
eavesdroppers from a distance of lOA (the separation distance for Chapter 4's experiment) 
to A/4 (the closest we can physically place the antennas together). 
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Figure 5.1 : Eavesdropper Proximity Topology 
5.1.2 Experimental Results 
Fig. 5.2 shows the SINR at the intended user (black) and the three eavesdroppers (blue, 
green, and red respectively) at varying proximity distances. 
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Figure 5.2 : SINR of Transmission to IV at varying AS. 
Omnidirectional Transmission 
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As similarly observed in Chapter 4, the eavesdroppers' overheard signal from the Omnidi-
rectional transmission is relatively high as seen in Fig. 5.2a. The only scenario in which 
the Omnidirectional scheme results in overheard signal energies substantially lower than 
the intended user is a combination of increased transmitter to eavesdropper distance and an 
obstructed eavesdropper LOS (E2 at d ~ 5A). The unpredictable behavior for all distances 
for this transmission scheme highlights the effect of multi-path signal propagation in in-
door environments. The intended user's position at the center of the table and conference 
room (farthest away from walls, chairs, and other reflectors) allowed its SINR to remain 
consistent. 
Single-User Beamforming 
Similarly, indoor multi-path effects are observed in the received SINR's of the eavesdrop-
pers when transmitting with SVBF (Fig. 5.2b). In fact, because the transmitted energy is 
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being actively focused, a greater variation of overheard SINR occurs at the eavesdroppers. 
For example, the position difference from >../2 to >./4 at E2 results in an 18 dB drop in 
signal strength even though the relative distance to the transmitter remains similar. The 
combination of a focused transmission and apparent randomness of multi-path occasion-
ally helps SUBF reduce the overheard signal energy (such as at El for d = 5>'), but this 
accidental nulling is in no way reliable. 
STROBE 
Regardless of eavesdropper proximity, the ability of STROBE to consistently blind the 
eavesdroppers while still serving the intended user regardless of proximity distance is 
shown in Fig. 5.2c. The multi-path effects on the transmitted signal that cause the high 
variation in eavesdropper performance when using Omnidirectional or SUBF schemes have 
the opposite effect on STROBE. The overheard SINR range of a blinded eavesdropper from 
STROBE shown in Fig. 5.2c is 5 dB whereas Omnidirectional and SUBF transmission's 
ranges are 14 and 24 dB respectively. The ability of the multi-stream methods to sepa-
rate receivers regardless of their relative distances observed in Fig. 5.2c and d matches the 
results shown in [9]. 
The only separation distance with an appreciable loss of SINR to the intended user for 
STROBE is >./4 (12 dB); at all other proximity distances, the intended user is consistently 
sent a 20 dB signal. However, considering that this proximity distance is physically the 
closest our test antennas could be placed (the antenna bases were adjacent), the 12 dB 
SINR at the intended user and 10 dB SINR gain over the eavesdropper shows promise 
for STROBE. In fact, this result at a proximity distance of 3.125 cm (>../4) implies that 
STROBE could potentially protect against covert eavesdropping devices secretly attached 
to the intended user device itself. 
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Cooperating Eavesdropper 
Differences in eavesdropper blinding abilities between STROBE and the impossible base-
line CE confirm the findings of Chapter 4. As detailed in Chapter 4.3, full knowledge of the 
eavesdroppers' channels allows for the complete blinding of the eavesdroppers as shown in 
Fig. 5.2 (the eavesdroppers lines are on top of one another). However, this precision comes 
at the cost of an SINR decrease for the intended user of 10 dB below STROBE. Addition-
ally, CE's ability to serve the intended user remains constant even at >./4. However, at that 
proximity distance, STROBE is still serves the intended user with a stronger signal. 
5.2 Inline Eavesdropper 
In this section we evaluate the effect of eavesdroppers inline with the intended user. The 
goal is to quantify the effects of eavesdroppers blocking and along the LOS path from the 
transmitter to the intended user. 
We expect the mUlti-path effects of the indoor environment to aid STROBE in blinding 
the eavesdroppers and serving the intended user as hypothesized in Chapter 5.1. However, 
the major component of any transmitted signal is the LOS path so the potential for a beam-
forming based scheme to select this path and inadvertently serve an eavesdropper on that 
path exists. 
5.2.1 Experimental Setup 
To evaluate the effect of eavesdroppers inline with the intended user, we set the transmitter 
a fixed distance (3 m) away from a line of receivers as shown in Fig. 5.3. We perform 
four iterations of the experiments setting each receiving node as the intended user and 
the other three as eavesdroppers. Although the four iterations produce similar results, the 
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topology shown where the intended user is second from the back results in the worst case 
performance for STROBE. (The remaining results are included in Appendix A.2.) We 
present and analyze the results obtained from this topology. 
Figure 5.3 : Inline Eavesdropper Topology 
5.2.2 Experimental Results 
Fig. 5.4 shows the received SINRs at the intended user and the eavesdropper. Recall from 
Fig. 5.3 that IU is located between E2 and E3 . 
Omnidirectional Transmission 
As observed in previous experiments, the received SINR of the Omnidirectional trans-
mission at the three eavesdropper positions is similar to the intended user. However, the 
received SINR at El is the lowest even though it is located closest to the transmitter with 
no other antenna blocking its LOS. This and the similar deficits in E2 's SINR offer further 
examples of multi-path effects in an indoor environment. 
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Figure 5.4 : SINR at ill and El-3 for in line receivers 
Single-User Beamforming 
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The received SINR from the SUBF transmission at El-2 surpasses the SINR at the intended 
user. Unlike the Omnidirectional transmission, SUBF focuses energy toward the intended 
user and takes the direct LOS path. This results in the highest SINR at E l followed by E2 
and then by the intended user (the exact order in which they are located) . This result shows 
that the best way to intercept a signal transmitted using SUBF is to simply eavesdrop in the 
LOS path of the intended user. 
STROBE 
STROBE serves the intended user with an SINR of 17 dB while allowing an eavesdropper 
to overhear, at most, an SINR of 4 dB (at E2). Unlike SUBF, STROBE handles the in 
line, LOS blocking eavesdroppers effectively by blinding them even given their positions. 
As previously stated, this intended user location did result in the worst case results for 
STROBE but even so, STROBE leverages multi-path effects and provides the intended 
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user with a 13 dB gain over the eavesdropper. 
Cooperating Eavesdropper 
As seen in previous topologies, CE precisely blinds the eavesdroppers allowing none of 
the intended user's signal energy to be overheard while serving the intended user with a 10 
dB signal as a result. Although the relative separation distances between the nodes were 
similar between this experiment and Chapter 4, the SINR difference at the intended user 
between STROBE and CE is almost twice as much (3 dB to 6 dB). The increased difficulty 
in compensating for in line eavesdroppers blocking LOS paths causes a greater hit in the 
intended user's SINR when CE attempts to precisely blind the eavesdroppers. Even if using 
this unrealistic scheme, the served SINR and relative gain over the eavesdropper SINR is 
still below that of STROBE. 
29 
Chapter 6 
Is Multi-Path Essential? 
STROBE's efficacy relies on multi-path effects in an indoor environment as described in 
Chapter 5. However, in outdoor environments (with significantly fewer multi-path effects), 
the authors of [10] claim that receiver separation distances of 70 m are required to serve 
users in parallel with ZFBF schemes. Multi-path is the hypothesized explanation for the 
ability of STROBE (along with CE) to function successfully indoors regardless of eaves-
dropper proximity, relative position, or location. If this assumption can be validated, we 
can expose another benefit of STROBE. Increased multi-path effects are caused by "busier" 
environments (i.e. more physical obstacles such as furniture). The "busier" an environment 
is, the larger the possibility for there to be eavesdroppers attempting to intercept an ill's 
signal. Thus, if STROBE benefits from multi-path, environments that support more eaves-
droppers may actually help STROBE further secure a wireless transmission. 
6.1 Experimental Setup 
In order to evaluate the effects of decreased multi-path on STROBE, we redo the exper-
iment described in Chapter 4 in an open space outdoors at considerable distance from 
buildings and other obstacles. The topology and relative distances between the nodes are 
identical to Fig. 4.1. Again, we perform four experiments setting each receiver as the in-
tended user and the other three as eavesdroppers. All experiments produced similar results 
and hence for a direct comparison, we use the intended user location shown in Fig. 4.1 
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whose indoor results are displayed in Fig. 4.2 (The remaining results are included in Ap-
pendix A.3). 
6.2 Experimental Results 
Fig. 6.1 shows the resulting SINRs when the transmitter sends a signal to the intended 
user in an open outdoor environment. The performance of Omnidirectional and SUBF 
transmissions are similar to the results from other indoor topologies. 
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Figure 6.1 : SINR at ill over El -3 in outdoor environment. 
However, the recreation of the initial experiment in an environment with far fewer 
multi-path effects results in drastic changes for the multi-stream methods. Observe the 
2 dB served SINR when using CE to the intended user indicating the absolute failure of 
this multi-stream method. CE relies on its ability to separate the receivers channels in or-
der to serve the intended user and precisely blind the eavesdroppers. Without multi-path, it 
is unable to do so. 
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In contrast, the served SINR at the intended user when using STROBE is almost 19 dB 
but the blinding abilities of STROBE completely fail at E3 where a 13 dB signal is over-
heard. Recall from Fig. 4.1 that E3 is located in front of the intended user and El -2 together 
on the opposite side. The eavesdropper SINR at El -2 is approximately 0 dB indicating 
that, without multi-path, STROBE is very susceptible to relative eavesdropper position and 
separation distance. Other results from setting the intended user at the different receiver po-
sitions confirm that without multi-path, STROBE becomes very directional and defeating 
the protocol simply requires approaching the intended user. 
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Chapter 7 
The Nomadic Eavesdropper 
In this chapter we consider a nomadic eavesdropper that traverses throughout an an indoor 
environment looking for the most opportune eavesdropping location. Previous experiments 
have demonstrated the wide variations in channel state from one position to the next due 
to multi-path effects. This randomness could permit a determined eavesdropper to exhaus-
tively search an environment looking for such an opportune location. 
7.1 Experimental Setup 
7.1.1 Topology 
To evaluate the potential of a location-based brute-force attack, we construct the topology 
shown in Fig. 7.1 in a large classroom (where each circle represents a seat). The classroom 
is filled with tables, chairs, and other objects that contribute to the rich multi-path char-
acteristics of the environment. We place the transmitter at the head of the room in front 
of the classroom podium and the intended user approximately 6 m away on a direct LOS 
path. We transmit data to the intended user while placing the eavesdroppers at 24 different 
locations around the classroom. The variety of different locations emulate the behavior of 
a determined eavesdropper searching for the optimal overhearing location. 
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Figure 7.1 : Classroom Environment 
7.1.2 Scheme Comparison 
Unlike previous experiments, we compare the performance of STROBE against a direc-
tional antenna instead of the unfeasible CE scheme. As described in Chapter 4.3, CE is 
only capable of precisely blinding one less than the number of transmit antennas eaves-
droppers (three) and for this topology we have 24. Additionally, the simplest way to focus 
signal energy in a particular direction is to use a directional antenna. Regardless of the 
antenna's transmission angle, a directionally based transmission should put energy toward 
a particular location but not elsewhere. This makes such an antenna a promising candidate 
for directionally motivated security. 
The antenna chosen for comparison is a Trendnet TEW-A009D* 60°, 9 dBi antenna 
*Trendnet TEW-A009D Directional Antenna - Available at: www . tre ndnet. com 
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Vert. Horizontal 
Figure 7.2 : Beam pattern of 60° directional antenna 
with a radiation pattern shown in Fig. 7.2. Although the width of the beam pattern precludes 
the possibility of perfectly removing overheard signal energy, the beam's shape suggests 
that regions of the environment can be spared from leaked ~ignal strength. 
7.2 Experimental Results 
The results shown in Figs. 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 are presented as maps of received signal 
energy where colors correspond to the different received signal strengths. Dark blues rep-
resent lower SINR whereas dark reds represent high SINRs. The maps are to the scale of 
Fig. 7.1 with intended user and eavesdropper circles corresponding to the separate squares 
on the maps. The numbers indicated in Fig. 7.1 will be used to identify individual eaves-
dropper locations. 
Omnidirectional Transmission 
As in previous experiments, observe the inherent randomness of multi-path effects when 
agnostically transmitting energy with an Omnidirectional scheme as shown in Fig. 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3 : Omnidirectional Transmission (dB) 
Note that the lowest received SINR for this scheme (location 9, 5 dB) is located in the 
seat next to the intended user who received an SINR of 25 dB. Additionally, observe the 
wide color variation in eavesdropper SINR with regards to location. There is no correlation 
between distance from the transmitter and received SINR. However, other than the low 
measurements at locations 9 and 14, all other eavesdroppers were able to overhear a signal 
of at least 10 dB while the intended user received a signal of 24 dB. 
The maximum received SINR from the Omnidirectional transmission is at location 22 
(27 dB) while the average SINR overheard by the eavesdroppers at all locations is 16 dB. 
Thus, even with the inherent randomness of signal strength due to multi-path, it is relatively 
easy for an eavesdropper to find the opportune location to overhear an Omnidirectional 
transmission. 
Single-User Beamforming 
Again, the results for SUBF from previous experiments with simpler topologies are con-
finned as shown in Fig. 7.4. 
SUBF 
Figure 7.4 : SUBF Transmission SINR (dB) 
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SUBF serves the highest SINR to the intended user (27 dB) out of all schemes. Al-
though the energy is focused toward a particular receiver, the high eavesdropper SINRs are 
located in places similar to that of the Omnidirectional transmission. 
For example, location 22 overheard the signal with an SINR of 27 dB, which is of 
equal power to the Omnidirectional transmission (and equal power to the intended user in 
this scheme). Locations 18,8, and 3 also had similarly high received SINRs for both Om-
nidirectional and SUBF transmissions (20-25 dB). These locations receiving high SINRs 
relative to the intended user are understandable for an Omnidirectional transmission due to 
the shorter eavesdropper to transmitter distance. Although SUBF focuses energy toward 
the intended user, it still suffers from the generation of side lobes. When this effect is com-
bined with multi-path, the result is a high overheard SINR at locations that are far away 
from the intended user. 
Overall, the average overheard SINR for the SUBF transmission is 14 dB. The strong 
overheard signal combined with the lack of correlation between eavesdropper location and 
overheard signal strength show that SUBF can be defeated by a nomadic eavesdropper. 
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Directional Antenna 
The passive directional transmission from the directional antenna focuses energy toward 
where it is physically pointed unlike SUBF. Although beamforming based methods are 
aided by multi-path, the side effect is the potential for random signal reflections to increase 
SINRs at unintended locations (such as location 22 for SUBF). Observe in Fig. 7.5 the 
ability of the directional antenna to passively focus energy toward a particular direction 
allowing the directional antenna to better cope with multi-path induced randomness seen 
in previous schemes. 
Directional Antenna 
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Figure 7.5 : Directional Antenna Transmission SINR (dB) 
Specifically, note the received SINR at location 22 (8 dB). This particular location 
receives a strong signal reflection for the Omnidirectional and SUBF schemes (27 dB) 
but is far lower for the directional antenna. Other examples of this phenomenon include 
locations 18, 8, and 3, which all received approximately 10 dB weaker overheard signals 
than the Omnidirectional and SUBF transmissions. Even so, the overheard signal at these 
locations is still strong, between 11-15 dB, while the intended user's SINR is 20 dB (4 and 
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7 dB less than the previous schemes). 
However, the Directional Antenna's ability to passively focus energy does not make it 
immune to multi-path effects. The randomness caused by multi-path is simply constrained 
to the area where the Directional Antenna is sending the energy. Consider location 9's 
received SINR of 6 dB. The intended user receives the signal at 20 dB even though it is 
located in the adjacent seat to location 9. Additionally, location 10 received the strongest 
signal overall (24 dB) from this transmission method by being behind the intended user and 
catching a strong reflection from the back wall of the classroom. 
Although the Directional Antenna reduces multi-path randomness on the sides of the 
classroom, it is still affected by multi-path effects where it actually sends the signal. Ad-
ditionally, the passive, directional transmission does not eliminate the overheard signal 
outside of its specified beampattem because of the constrained nature of the indoor envi-
ronment. The average overheard SINR is still 13 dB and because there is some correlation 
between location and overheard SINR, it is feasible for an eavesdropper to move toward 
the intended user looking for favorable signal strength. 
STROBE 
As similarly observed in previous, simpler topologies, STROBE successfully blinds eaves-
droppers as depicted in Fig. 7.6. 
Observe that while the intended user receives a signal of 20 dB (shown as orange), 
all eavesdropper locations receive far less signal energy (all shades of blue). The maxi-
mum overheard signal is at location 16 (5 dB). Additionally, 60% of the overheard signal 
strengths are less than 1 dB. By employing orthogonal blinding, STROBE successfully and 
consistently diminishes eavesdropper SINR regardless of location. 
STROBE's ability to handle multi-path randomness is also pronounced. Not only does 
STROBE 
Figure 7.6 : STROBE Transmission SINR (dB) 
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STROBE consistently blind eavesdroppers, it also handles irregular reflection locations 
(such as location 22) far better than Omnidirectional and SUBF transmissions. Although 
location 22 resulted in the second strongest overheard location, the eavesdropper SINR was 
limited to 4 dB, far less than the 27 dB overheard SINR for the first two schemes. 
Additionally, the overall average SINR for STROBE was only 1.3 dB, showing that 
STROBE outperformed the other three schemes by 12-14 dB in overheard SINR. These 
consistently low overheard SINRs, regardless of eavesdropper location, show that STROBE 
can easily withstand a determined eavesdropper attempting to search for an opportune 
eavesdropping location. 
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Chapter 8 
Related Work 
8.1 Wireless security exploiting CSI-based secret 
One method of guarding a transmitter from an eavesdropper is CSI-based secret sharing. 
For example, the authors of [11] directly use intended user's CSI as a secret generation 
method while the authors of [12] use the intended user's CSI to actively disrupt OFDM 
subcarriers in order to confuse eavesdroppers. In contrast, our implementation uses the 
CSI to beamform a signal toward the intended user while simultaneously blinding eaves-
droppers. Moreover, because our method's use of CSI is independent of the aforementioned 
works, the two methods are complementary. 
8.2 Beamforming-based multiple AP cooperation 
Beamforming schemes that rely on groups of cooperating APs have also been proposed 
to secure wireless networks. The authors of [13] propose a method of securing wireless 
communications using a collection of phased arrays working in tandem to serve an intended 
user with a data stream. Each AP provides partial information of the overall data transfer 
and relies on precise, directionally based transmissions to ensure the intersection of all 
partial streams at a particular geographic location. Additionally, the authors of [14] propose 
a set of multiple AP methods that allow information to be focused toward an intended 
user but away from an eavesdropper. Although the authors propose the use of adaptive 
array beamformers, the weight construction technique employed is directly based on the 
41 
physical shape of the constructed beam. However, such techniques can be unpredictable 
in indoor environments as shown in [2] and verified by our experiments in Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, both of these works propose schemes that require multiple APs and custom 
hardware whereas STROBEuses a single AP and is compatible with 802.11ac and lIn. 
STROBE is able to accomplish the same goal from a single transmitter because the scheme 
leverages the capabilities of multi-stream transmission methods. 
8.3 Information theoretic multi-antenna security 
There have been a number of information theoretic studies that examine the theoretical 
performance of multi-antenna based security methods [15,16]. In particular, these works 
define the fundamental limits of secrecy capacity. For example, [16] proves that a non-
zero rate of communication can be guaranteed to' be secret for any eavesdropper position. 
In contrast, our focus is on protocol design and experimental evaluation with alternate 
schemes. Likewise, [17] explores how eavesdroppers can be thwarted by a cooperative 
communication scheme. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we design and experimentally characterize STROBE, a method of enhanc-
ing wireless security using Zero-Forcing Beamforming. We implement STROBE in the 
WARPLab experimental platform allowing us to comparatively evaluate it against Omnidi-
rectional, Single-User Beamforming, Directional Antenna, and Cooperating Eavesdropper 
transmission schemes. We show that STROBE achieves a higher SINR difference between 
the intended user and the eavesdropper than the single-target schemes because of its abil-
ity to blind. Additionally, we show that STROBE achieves a higher SINR difference that 
the unrealistic Cooperating Eavesdropper scheme because STROBE maximizes the SINR 
at the intended receiver while blinding eavesdroppers. We also demonstrate the perfor-
mance of STROBE in a variety of indoor, multi-path rich environments and show its effi-
cacy regardless of eavesdropper proximity or obstruction from the transmitter. We verify 
that STROBE's performance is due in part to the presence of multi-path effects in indoor 
environments by observing STROBE's diminished efficacy outdoors. Finally, we show 
STROBE's resilience from the nomadic eavesdropper that traverses an environment contin-
uously searching for an opportune eavesdropping location. Thus, STROBE is a minimally 
invasive, viable method of augmenting wireless security using existing wireless technolo-
gies. 
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Appendix A 
Additional Plots 
This appendix contains all plots for the experiments in Chapters 4, 5.2, and 6. Each ofthese 
experiments used four receivers setting one as the intended user and the others as the eaves-
droppers. In each of the aforementioned chapters, only one intended user/eavesdropper 
permutation was presented. The rest can be found in this appendix. 
A.1 Additional Plots for Baseline WLAN Scenario (Chapter 4) 
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Figure A.2 : Complete results for Chapter 4 
The results and plot shown in Fig. A.2(b) were presented in Chapter 4. 
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A.2 Additional Plots for Inline Eavesdropper Scenario (Chapter 5.2) 
Figure A.3 : Inline Eavesdropper Topology 
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Figure AA : Complete results for Chapter 5.2 
The results and plot shown in Fig. AA(c) were presented in Chapter 5.2. 
A.3 Additional Plots for Outdoor Scenario (Chapter 6) 
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Figure A.5 : Outdoor Topology 
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Figure A.6 : Complete results for Chapter 6 
The results and plot shown in Fig. A.6(b) were presented in Chapter 6. 
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